A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games by Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
A SOCIAL CHOICE LEMMA ON VOTING OVER LOTTERIES WITH
APPLICATIONS TO A CLASS OF DYNAMIC GAMES
Jerey S. Banks
California Institute of Technology
John Duggan
University of Rochester
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1163
May 2003
A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries
with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
Jerey S. Banks John Duggan
Abstract
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of
Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or \core") point,
the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this
is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting
games are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The prominence of electoral systems based on majority rule has prompted much research
on the nature of majority preferences. McGarvey (1953) has shown that, when the set
of alternatives is nite, asymmetry is the only property displayed by strict majority
preferences across electorates with varying size and preferences. When the size and
preferences of the electorate are xed, more structure must be imposed on the social
choice environment (the set of alternatives and the form of individual preferences) to
deduce a sharper characterization. The spatial model, where the set of alternatives is a
convex subset of nite-dimensional Euclidean space and individual preferences are subject
to various regularity conditions, provides such an environment.
Work initiated by Plott (1967) and McKelvey (1976, 1979, 1986) has, for exam-
ple, established strong necessary conditions required for the existence of a majority-
undominated (or \core") point in multiple dimensions, and it has provided characteriza-
tions of several sets (the top cycle and uncovered set) derived from the majority preference
relation. Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich (1972), in contrast, begin with the assumption that
the core is non-empty and completely characterize the majority preference relation when
individual preferences are Euclidean, i.e., the preferred of two alternatives is the one
closer to a voter's \ideal point," and when an additional regularity condition holds.
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Their Theorem 4 establishes that the majority weak preference relation is transitive and,
in fact, coincides with the weak preference relation of the \core voter." That is, the
majority-preferred of any two alternatives is the one closer to the core. While this is
strictly a social choice theory result, it has proved useful in game-theoretic models of
elections as well (cf. Calvert (1985) and Duggan and Fey (2001)).

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They assume that, for every direction, there is a unique \median hyperplane," a condition that holds
if the number of individuals is odd or if ideal points are distributed according to a positive density. It
implies that there is at most one core point.
In this paper, we strengthen Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich's (1972) assumption on indi-
vidual preferences and extend their conclusion to majority preferences over lotteries. We
assume not only that individual preferences over pure alternatives are Euclidean, but also
that they have quadratic numerical representations that extend individual preferences to
the space of lotteries over alternatives. If the core is non-empty and the regularity
condition of the latter authors holds, then, once again, the core voter is decisive: the
majority-preferred of two alternatives is the one that yields the highest expected utility,
evaluated using the quadratic utility function with ideal point at the core. The proof
of the result is rather simple, relying on mean-variance analysis, a property of quadratic
utilities. Because majority preferences over pure alternatives are unaected by arbitrary
monotonic transformations of quadratic utilities, Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich's (1972)
result for Euclidean preferences follows as a corollary.
While our assumption of quadratic preferences is restrictive, of course, it is widely
used in theoretical and empirical work. We demonstrate the usefulness of our lemma
with a result for a class of dynamic games, in which play proceeds in stages and deter-
mines a sequence of outcomes over time evaluated by the players according to discounted
quadratic utility. We assume a common discount factor; we allow for incomplete infor-
mation, so that players actually must evaluate lotteries over sequences of outcomes; and
we allow for a continuum of players, to capture models of large electorates. The result is
that majority preferences over action proles in any stage coincide with the preferences
of the \core player," appropriately dened. In the context of a binary voting stage, in
which the continuation of the game depends only on which of two alternatives receives
majority support, and assuming players eliminate stage-dominated voting strategies, this
means that the alternative preferred by the core player will win.
We illustrate with several theoretical applications. Among them, we consider a one-
dimensional version of the innite-horizon bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
with an arbitrary status quo policy, as in Banks and Duggan (2003). Assuming quadratic
utilities, our results imply that the approval of the median voter is necessary and suÆcient
for a proposal to pass, an observation used in Banks and Duggan (2000) to prove \core
equivalence" under the assumption of perfect patience. We also consider a model of
repeated elections related to the family of models analyzed in Duggan (2000), Bernhardt,
Hughson, and Dubey (2002), and Banks and Duggan (2002). Applied here, the lemma
generalizes observations in the latter papers that the median voter is decisive, in the
sense that an incumbent is reelected if and only if the median voter prefers it. Thus,
the lemma delivers a type of centrality of the median voter in these models close to (but
distinct from) the median voter theorem of Black (1958) and Downs (1957).
Technically, by characterizing the set of proposals that can pass (in the bargaining
model) and the policies that lead to reelection (in repeated elections models), the lemma
allows us to reformulate the optimization problem of the proposer or oÆceholder, thereby
simplifying the task of working through analytic examples, the numerical computation of
stationary equilibria, and the determination of comparative statics in quadratic models.
The lemma has applications to other models of repeated elections (Campuzano (2001),
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Duggan and Fey (2002), Meirowitz (2002)), and it oers to facilitate the investigation
of topics such as uniqueness of stationary equilibria in the one-dimensional bargaining
model (Cho and Duggan (2002)) and the possibility of multiple parties in models of
repeated elections.
2 A Social Choice Lemma
Suppose a set of individuals must choose from a subset X of Euclidean space of nite
dimension d. Each individual i has a Euclidean preference weak relation %
i
on X, i.e.,
there exists an ideal point ~x
i
2 R
d
such that, for all x; y 2 X, x %
i
y if and only if
jjx  ~x
i
jj  jjy  ~x
i
jj. Because an individual's preference relation is determined by his or
her ideal point, we write %
~x
for the preference relation corresponding to ideal point ~x. We
use 
~x
and 
~x
to denote the associated strict preference and indierence relations. (This
notation for strict preference and indierence is applied to other relations throughout the
paper.) Suppose that individual ideal points are distributed across R
d
according to the
probability measure , which may be non-atomic to capture a continuum of individuals.
We say x is weakly majority-preferred to y, written x % y, if
(f~x j x %
~x
yg) 
1
2
:
The majority core consists of the points x 2 X that are weakly preferred to all others,
i.e., x % y for all y 2 X.
Let  denote the set of lotteries, or Borel probability measures, on X, and let %

i
denote the extension of i's preference relation to this space. Suppose the preferences
of an individual with ideal point ~x are extended to lotteries on X by the quadratic
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u
~x
(x) =  jjx   ~xjj
2
. Following the above
convention, let %

~x
denote the preferences over lotteries corresponding to ideal point ~x.
Thus, for all ;  2 ,  %

~x
 if and only if
Z
u
~x
(x)(dx) 
Z
u
~x
(x)(dx):
We say  is weakly majority-preferred to , written  %

, if
(f~x j  %

~x
g) >
1
2
:
Our goal in this section is to characterize the majority preference relation on lotteries in
terms of the preferences of the \core voter."
A special property of the quadratic extension is that expected utility from a lottery 
can be decomposed into two components, one depending on the mean of  and the other
depending on its variance. Let m =
R
x (dx) denote the mean of , and let
v =
Z
(x m)  (x m)(dx)
3
denote the variance. Then the expected utility of  for an individual with ideal point ~x
is
Z
u
~x
(x)(dx) =  jjm  ~xjj   v:
Note that the disutility from the variance of  is independent of the individual's ideal
point.
Given x; t 2 R
d
, the open half-space at x in direction t is
H
+
t
(x) = fy 2 R
d
j y  t > x  tg:
We say x is a median in all directions if, for every direction t, (H
+
t
(x))  1=2. Every
median in all directions, if contained in X, is a majority core point. Furthermore, if
x 2 intX is a majority core point, then it is a median in all directions (cf. Davis, DeGroot,
and Hinich, 1972): if the proportion of individuals in H
+
t
(x) were greater than one half,
then a small enough move from x in the t direction would result in a majority-preferred
point, an impossibility.
We say  is resolute at x 2 R
d
if, for every direction t with (H
+
t
(x))  1=2 and for
every  > 0,
(H
+
t
(x + t)) <
1
2
:
In words, given any hyperplane through x that evenly divides the ideal points of the
individuals, an arbitrarily small shift of the hyperplane will put strictly more than half
of the individuals to one side.
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This condition clearly holds at every x 2 R
d
if the set of
individuals is nite and odd in number.
If  is non-atomic with strictly positive density on some open set containing x, then
the following holds: for every open set G around x and for every direction t, we have
(G \ H
+
t
(x)) > 0. Furthermore, the latter condition implies that  is resolute at x:
given direction t with (H
+
t
(x))  1=2 and given  > 0, let G be any open set around x
with G \H
+
t
(x + t) = ; to fulll the denition of resoluteness. Thus, if  is supported
on an open set around x, then it is resolute at x.
If x is a median in all directions and  is resolute at x, then x is the unique median
in all directions; in fact,
(f~x j x 
~x
yg) >
1
2
for all y 6= x. To see this, take any y distinct from x. Then (H
+
y x
(x))  1=2, but then,
because  is resolute at x, we have (H
+
y x
(z)) < 1=2 for z = (1=2)(x+ y), which implies
(H
+
x y
(y)) > 1=2. Thus, y is not a median in all directions.
2
Assuming existence of a median in all directions, x, resoluteness at x is equivalent to uniqueness of
a median hyperplane in all directions, which is used by Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich (1972).
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The main result of this paper is the next lemma. It is stated in terms of a median
in all directions for maximum strength, but the primary interest is in the application to
(interior) majority core points. Part (i) shows that, if one lottery is weakly preferred
to another by the core voter, then the rst is weakly majority-preferred to the second.
Moreover, any two lotteries that are equally desirable to the core voter are majority-
indierent. This result, which generalizes Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich's (1972) Theorem
3, does not show that a lottery strictly preferred by the core voter is strictly majority
preferred, but it does not assume  is resolute. It therefore holds even if there are multiple
core points. Part (ii) strengthens the conclusion of the rst part: an implication is that, if
(fxg) = 0 or there is a nite, odd number of individuals, then any two lotteries that are
equally desirable to the core voter must have equal proportions of voters with opposing
strict preferences over them. It is closely related to Theorem 2 of McKelvey, Ordeshook,
and Ungar (1980), which generalizes Plott's (1967) necessary symmetry conditions at a
core point.
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Finally, part (iii) gives a full characterization of majority preferences over
lotteries when there is a majority core point at which  is resolute (and is, therefore, the
unique core point): majority preferences are idential to the core voter's.
Lemma 1 Let x be a median in all directions. Then (i)  %

x

0
implies  %


0
, (ii) if
 

x

0
, then
j(f~x j  
~x

0
g)  (f~x j  
~x
g)j  (fxg);
and (iii) if  is resolute at x, then  %

x

0
if and only if  %


0
.
To prove part (i) of the lemma, take any ; 
0
2  such that  %

x

0
. Letting m and
m
0
denote the means of these lotteries and letting v and v
0
denote their variances, we
then have,
u
x
(m)  u
x
(m
0
)  v   v
0
: (1)
Since x is a median in all directions, we have (H
+
m
0
 m
(x))  1=2. Note that, for all
~x =2 H
+
m
0
 m
(x), we have
~x  (m m
0
)  x  (m m
0
);
implying
u
~x
(m)  u
~x
(m
0
)  u
x
(m)  u
x
(m
0
): (2)
Then, by (1) and (2), we have
u
~x
(m)  u
~x
(m
0
)  v   v
0
for all ~x =2 H
+
m
0
 m
(x). Therefore,  %


0
, as required.
3
In contrast to McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Ungar (1980), we allow the distribution of ideal points to
be discrete, in order to capture a nite number of individuals.
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To prove part (ii), take any ; 
0
2  such that  

x

0
. Using the notation above,
let m and m
0
denote the means of these lotteries and v and v
0
the variances. We then
have
u
x
(m)  u
x
(m
0
) = v   v
0
:
Note that H
+
m m
0
(x) = f~x j  
~x

0
g and H
+
m
0
 m
(x) = f~x j 
0

~x
g, let
 = (H
+
m m
0
(x))  (H
+
m
0
 m
(x))  (fxg); (3)
and suppose  > 0. For any t 2 R
d
, let
H
t
(x) = fy 2 R
d
j y  t = x  tg
denote the hyperplane through x with normal t. Take any t 2 R
d
such that
(H
m m
0
(x) \H
t
(x) n fxg) <

2
: (4)
(The existence of such a t follows from an argument similar to that used in the proof
of Theorem 2 in McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Ungar (1980, pp.164-165).) Without loss of
generality, assume that
(H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x))  (H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
 t
(x)): (5)
Dene y(n) = m + (1=n)t, let f
n
denote the indicator function of H
+
y(n) m
0
(x), and note
that the sequence ff
n
g of indicator functions converges pointwise to the indicator function
of H
m m
0
(x). Thus, Egoro's Theorem (cf. Kingman and Taylor (1966), Theorem 7.1)
yields n such that
(H
+
m m
0
(x) nH
+
y(n) m
0
(x)) <

4
: (6)
It is an identity that
1 = (H
+
m m
0
(x)) + (H
+
m
0
 m
(x)) + (H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x))
+(H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
 t
(x)) + (H
m m
0
(x) \H
t
(x) n fxg) + (fxg):
Solving for (H
+
m m
0
(x)) in (3) and substituting, and using (5), we have
1  2(H
+
m
0
 m
(x)) + 2(H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x)) + 2(fxg)
+(H
m m
0
(x) \H
t
(x) n fxg) + :
Using (4) the latter inequality yields
(H
+
m
0
 m
(x)) + (fxg) + (H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x)) +
3
4
>
1
2
: (7)
From (6) and (3), respectively, we have
(H
+
y(n) m
0
(x) \H
+
m m
0
(x)) > (H
+
m m
0
(x)) 

4
= (H
+
m
0
 m
(x)) + (fxg) +
3
4
: (8)
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Given ~x 2 H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x), note that
(~x  x)  (y(n) m
0
) = (~x  x)  (m+ (1=n)t m
0
) = (1=n)(~x  x)  t > 0:
Therefore, H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x)  H
+
y(n) m
0
(x), which implies
(H
+
y(n) m
0
(x) \H
m m
0
(x))  (H
m m
0
(x) \H
+
t
(x)): (9)
Finally, combining (7), (8), and (9), we have (H
+
y(n) m
0
(x)) > 1=2, but then x is not
a median in all directions, a contradiction. A symmetric argument addresses the case
(H
+
m
0
 m
(x)) > (H
+
m m
0
(x)) + (fxg), as required.
To prove part (iii), take any ; 
0
2  such that  

x

0
, i.e.,
u
x
(m)  u
x
(m
0
) > v   v
0
: (10)
Since x is a median in all directions, we have (H
+
m
0
 m
(x))  1=2. Because  is resolute
at x, we have (H
+
m
0
 m
(x())) < 1=2 for all  > 0, where x() = x + (m
0
  m). Note
that, for all ~x =2 H
+
m
0
 m
(x()), we have
~x  (m m
0
)  x()  (m m
0
);
implying
u
~x
(m)  u
~x
(m
0
))  u
x()
(m)  u
x()
(m
0
): (11)
Pick  small enough, using continuity and (10), so that
u
x()
(m)  u
x()
(m
0
) > v   v
0
: (12)
Then, by (11) and (12), we have
u
~x
(m)  u
~x
(m
0
) > v   v
0
for all ~x =2 H
+
m
0
 m
(x()). Because (H
+
m
0
 m
(x())) < 1=2, this implies that  


0
, as
required. This completes the proof.
While we have stated Lemma 2.1 for majority rule, it is easily extended to the class
of weighted majority rules by applying the lemma to the \weighted" distribution of ideal
points. Specically, suppose that (N;) is a measurable space of voters; suppose that
~x : N ! X is a measurable mapping such that ~x
i
is the ideal point of individual i; and
suppose that ! is a probability measure on  assigning weights to measurable coalitions
C 2  such that x % y if and only if
!(fi 2 N j x %
i
yg) 
1
2
:
Then, dening  = ! Æ ~x
 1
as the weighted distribution of ideal points, the weighted
majority rule is formally equivalent to majority rule with distribution . The lemma
extends to arbitrary simple voting rules, those generated by a \monotonic" and \proper"
class of winning coalitions, though parts (ii) and (iii) require that the rule be \strong"
and continuous in a certain sense. (See Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (2003) for this
framework.) We omit the details of this extension.
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3 A Class of Dynamic Games
Suppose a (possibly nite) measurable set N  [0; 1] of individuals play an extensive
form game of incomplete information with the following structure. Each individual has
a measurable set T  R
e
of types. The set of type proles, the measurable mappings
 : N ! T , is endowed with a sigma algebra, which may vary depending on the applica-
tion, and a common prior probability measure.
The extensive form is a stage game, where, given the initial history h
0
, a measurable
subset N(h
0
) of players simultaneously choose actions in the set A(h
0
), while all other
players choose a null action a. Denoting the prole of actions by active players as a 2
A(h
0
)
N(h
0
)
, we have the history h
1
= (h
0
; a) of length one. After h
1
, a measurable set
N(h
1
) of players then simultaneously choose actions in A(h
1
) while others play the null
action, producing a history of length two, and so on. Because the strategy sets of the
players are arbitrary, we may assume without loss of generality that this process continues
ad innitum. Let H
k
denote the set of histories of length k; let H =
S
1
k=1
H
k
denote
the set of all nite histories of the game; and let H
1
denote the set of innite histories.
Finally, let A =
S
h
k
2H
A(h
k
) [ fag denote the set of all possible actions. The sets H
k
must be endowed with appropriate sigma algebras, which may vary with the application
and which we leave undened. See Application 4.3 for an example.
Each type t corresponds to an ideal point ~x
t
in R
d
. We assume the mapping t 7! ~x
t
is
measurable and one-to-one, and we simply identify types with ideal points in the sequel.
We assume every nite history h
k
generates a sequence f
k
(h
k
) of length l
k
in a bounded
set X  R
d
, e.g., f
k
(h
k
) = (x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
l
k
), where each f
k
is a measurable mapping
from H
k
to X
l
k
, the set of sequences in X of length l
k
. We impose the consistency
condition that the continuation of a history simply extends the sequence of outcomes
in X: given histories h
k
and h
k+1
= (h
k
; a), we have f
k
n
(h
k
) = f
k+1
n
(h
k+1
) for all n =
1; 2; : : : ; l
k
. Without loss of generality, we assume that l
k
! 1. Thus, every innite
history corresponds to an innite sequence of points in X, denoted x = (x
1
; x
2
; : : :).
Given an innite history and an associated sequence of outcomes, a type t player's payo
in the game is
U
t
(x) = (1  Æ)
1
X
k=1
Æ
k 1
u
t
(x
k
);
where u
t
is the quadratic utility function with ideal point ~x
t
and Æ 2 [0; 1) is a common
discount factor.
A strategy prole is a mapping  : N  T  H ! A such that 
i
(t; h
k
) 2 A(h
k
)
for all i 2 N(h
k
) and 
i
(t; h
k
) = a for all i =2 N(h
k
). Here, of course, 
i
(t; h
k
) is the
action taken by type t of player i after history h
k
. In applications, 
i
must also respect
a player's information sets, not specied above. That is, if (h
k
; a) and (h
k
; a
0
) are not
distinguishable to player i, and so lie in the same information set, then we must have

i
(t; (h
k
; a)) = 
i
(t; (h
k
; a
0
)).
8
A belief assessment is a mapping  from N  T H to probability measures on type
proles, where 
i
(t; h
k
) represents the beliefs of type t of player i about the types of all
players after history h
k
. In applications, beliefs must be consistent with Bayes rule and
must respect the players' information sets. For each i, t, and h
k
, the beliefs , together
with a strategy prole , induces a probability measure 
k+1
i
(t; h
k
) on histories of length
k + 1 dened by

k+1
i
(t; h
k
)(G) = 
i
(t; h
k
)(f j (h
k
; (
i
((i); h
k
))
i2N(h
k
)
) 2 Gg)
for all measurable G  H
k+1
. We maintain throughout the joint measurability assump-
tion on H, , and the space of type proles that sets of type proles of the above form are
measurable.
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We dene the probability measure 
k+2
(t; h
k
) on histories of length k + 2
by

k+2
i
(t; h
k
)(G)
= 
i
(t; h
k
)(f j (h
k
; (
i
((i); h
k
))
i2N(h
k
)
; (
i
((i); h
k+1
))
i2N(h
k+1
)
) 2 Gg)
for all measurable G  H
k+2
, where we use the shorthand
h
k+1
= (h
k
; (
i
((i); h
k
))
i2N(h
k
)
):
We dene the probability measure 
k+m
(t; h
k
) on histories of length k +m, for any m,
similarly. Again, we maintain the measurability assumptions required for this.
Given t and h
k
, we can use these probability measures to dene player i's beliefs
about the sequence of future outcomes in X. For measurable subsets X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
n
of
X, dene 
i
(t; h
k
) as

i
(t; h
k
)(X
1
    X
n
X X    )
= 
k+m
i
(t; h
k
)(fh
k+m
2 H
k+m
j f
k+m
j
(h
k+m
) 2 X
j
for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; ng);
where l
k+m
= n. This denes 
i
(t; h
k
) on the initial nite cylinder sets, and we can extend

i
(t; h
k
) to the sigma algebra on X
N
generated by sets of that form. We can then dene
i's continuation value at h
k
, conditional on t, by
v
i
(t; h
k
) = (1  Æ)
Z
1
X
m=k+1
Æ
m k 1
u
t
(x
m
) 
i
(t; h
k
)(dx); (13)
which is well-dened as U
(i)
is measurable with respect to the sigma algebra on X
N
. We
say beliefs are symmetric at type prole  and history h
k
if 
i
((i); h
k
) = 
j
((j); h
k
)
for all i; j 2 N(h
k
). Note that, in this case, players of the same type have the same
continuation value, so we may drop the subscript i from 
i
and v
i
.
The following result characterizes majority preferences over action proles following
an arbitrary history, when an arbitrary probability measure on individuals is used to
4
This measurability holds, of course, if H is endowed with the trivial sigma algebra, f;; Hg, but then
the f
k
's must be history-independent.
9
\count votes." Moreover, the characterization holds for an arbitrary type prole, which
may not be common knowledge. The main assumption, other than quadratic utilities
and existence of a majority core point, is that beliefs about future outcomes in X are
symmetric. Using Lemma 1, we show that majority preferences over action proles are
identical to the \core" player's.
Proposition 2 Let  be an arbitrary type prole, let h
k
be an arbitrary nite history,
let  be an arbitrary probability measure on N(h
k
), and assume beliefs are symmetric at
 and h
k
. Dene  =  Æ 
 1
, let x 2 X be a median in all directions, and suppose  is
resolute at x. Then, for all a; a
0
2 A(h
k
)
N(h
k
)
,
(ft j v(t; (h
k
; a))  v(t; (h
k
; a
0
))g) 
1
2
if and only if v(x; (h
k
; a))  v(x; (h
k
; a
0
)).
By belief symmetry, the beliefs of each i 2 N(h
k
) about the sequence of future
outcomes in X following a are given by the same probability measure on X
N
. Let 
m
denote the marginal of this probability measure on the mth component. By additive
separability, we may write
v(t; (h
k
; a)) = (1  Æ)
1
X
m=1
Z
Æ
m 1
u
t
(x
m
)
m
(dx
m
)
Letting
 = (1  Æ)
1
X
m=1
Æ
m 1

m
;
we then have
v(t; (h
k
; a)) =
Z
u
t
(x)(dx):
That is, we can express a type t player's continuation value as the expected utility from
the lottery , which is itself independent of t. Similarly, we can express continuation
values following a
0
as the expected utility from some lottery 
0
. The result then follows
directly from Lemma 2.1, completing the proof.
Given type prole , we call h
k
a voting stage if (i) beliefs are symmetric at  and
h
k
, (ii) A(h
k
) consists of two elements, say 0 and 1, and (iii) there exists a probability
measure  on N(h
k
) such that each player's continuation value following a 2 f0; 1g
N(h
k
)
takes one value if the proportion of \one-votes" is above one half and takes another value
if the proportion is less than or equal to one half. Formally, by the latter condition we
mean that there exists  such that, for each t 2 T , there exist q
t
; r
t
2 R such that
v(t; (h
k
; a)) =

q
t
if (fi j a
i
= 0g)  1=2
r
t
if (fi j a
i
= 1g) > 1=2;
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where a
i
is the action taken by i in the prole a. Note that this denition of a voting
stage restricts not only the extensive game form but also the strategy prole , because
individual continuation values depend on future stages only through the \winner" at h
k
.
Thus, our result, below, on voting stages would not apply to equilibria in which any voter
is subject to punishment contingent specically on his/her vote.
An issue that arises in the analysis of voting stages is the multiplicity of Nash equi-
libria: any prole of votes such that no voter is pivotal (i.e., no voter can unilaterally
move the proportion of zero-votes above and below one half) forms a Nash equilibrium
of the voting subgame. Indeed, in models with a continuum of voters, voters can never
be pivotal in elections. In such cases, it makes sense to rene the possible equilibria by
assuming each voter takes the action that oers the higher continuation value. Let 0
denote the action prole consisting of all zeroes for members of N(h
k
), and let 1 denote
the action prole consisting of all ones. Formally, we might require that, given type
prole , each i votes for 1 (a
i
= 1) if
v
i
((i); (h
k
; 1)) > v
i
((i); (h
k
; 0))
and votes for 0 (a
i
= 0) if the reverse inequality holds. In the context of a nite number
of voters, this renement amounts to the elimination of strategies dominated in the stage
game. In the context of a continuum of voters, because no strategy is dominated in the
voting stage, it amounts to a sincere voting requirement (but does not imply any voter
myopia). If  satises this condition, we say it is stage-undominated for type prole 
at history h
k
. This does not restrict i's strategy when the above holds with equality. In
applications with a nite number of voters, it is often assumed that the voter ips a coin in
this case. Another common assumption is that one alternative is the \default" choice and
receives i's vote. If equality implies 
i
((i); h
k
) = 0, then we say  is stage-undominated
with default bias.
Our last result characterizes the outcomes of voting stages for stage-undominated
strategy proles: essentially, voting produces a continuation value (q
t
or r
t
) if and only
if it is higher for the core voter's type. Again, the characterization holds even if the type
prole is not common knowledge.
Proposition 3 Let  be an arbitrary type prole, let h
k
be a voting stage with probability
measure  on N(h
k
), let  be stage-undominated for  at h
k
, and assume beliefs are
symmetric at  and h
k
. Dene  =  Æ 
 1
, let x 2 X be a median in all directions, and
suppose  is resolute at x. Then
 (fi j a
i
= 1g) > 1=2 if v(x; (h
k
; 1)) > v(x; (h
k
; 0))
 (fi j a
i
= 0g) > 1=2 if v(x; (h
k
; 0)) > v(x; (h
k
; 1)).
If  is stage-undominated with default bias, then
 (fi j a
i
= 0g)  1=2 if and only if v(x; (h
k
; 0))  v(x; (h
k
; 1)).
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If, for example, v(x; (h
k
; 1)) > v(x; (h
k
; 0)), then Proposition 3.1 implies
(ft j v(t; (h
k
; 1)) > v(t; (h
k
; 0))g) >
1
2
;
or equivalently,
(fi j v((i); (h
k
; 1)) > v((i); (h
k
; 0))g) >
1
2
:
Because  is stage-undominated, this implies that (fi j a
i
= 1g) > 1=2, as required.
The rest of the propsition is proved similarly, completing proof.
4 Applications
We end with three applications of the above results.
4.1 Campaigning
Suppose a nite, odd number of voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
over a one-dimensional policy space X  R and must vote between an incumbent, with
known policy position x 2 X and an unknown challenger. The challenger's position,
y, is distributed according to the common prior distribution function F with density f .
Conditional on y, the voters observe a common signal z, distributed according to G(jy)
with density g(jy). After updating using Bayes rule, the voters' common beliefs about
the challenger's position are given by the density
b(y) =
g(zjy)f(y)
R
g(zjs)f(s) ds
:
Assume the voters eliminate weakly dominated strategies, so that a voter with ideal point
~x votes for the incumbent if
u
~x
(x) >
Z
u
~x
(y)b(y) dy; (14)
and votes for the challenger if this inequality is reversed. The winner is the candidate
with the most votes.
This model can be mapped into the framework of the previous section by including
the two candidates as players, the challenger with type y distributed according to f ,
and adding a dummy player n, \nature," whose type w is distributed according to the
continuous distribution H and whose action determines the signal observed by voters: n
takes an action z = 
n
(w; y), where 
n
is continuous and strictly increasing in w. We
require that H and 
n
satisfy
G(zjy) = H(
n
(zjy)
 1
)
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for all y; z 2 R, where 
n
(zjy)
 1
is the unique w satisfying 
n
(w; y) = z. After the choice
of z, we give the voters beliefs over y with the above density b, consistent with Bayesian
updating when voters observe z but not y or w. Obviously, this is a voting stage with the
counting measure on the set of voters. Because X is one-dimensional and the number
of voters is odd, there is a unique median in all directions, x

, and the distribution of
ideal points is resolute at x

. In fact, x

is simply the median of the distribution of ideal
points.
A direct implication of Proposition 3.2 is that the incumbent will win if the strict
inequality in (14) holds for the median, and the challenger will win if the opposite holds.
An implication of part (ii) of Lemma 2.1 is that, when equality obtains in (14), the
number of voters who strictly prefer the incumbent will equal the number of voters
who strictly prefer the challenger. If indierent voters ip coins in the original model,
then each candidate will win with probability one half, conditional on the median being
indierent. If indierent voters vote for the incumbent, as is sometimes assumed, he/she
will win with probability one, again conditional on median indierence.
In the sketch of the above model, we did not specify the voters' information about
each other's ideal points. In fact, because Proposition 3.2 holds for an arbitrary type
prole, even if there is incomplete information, the results described above hold for every
realization of voter ideal points. The dierence made by incomplete information is that
the identity of the median voter may be unknown (even to the median).
4.2 Bargaining
Suppose an odd number of agents, 1; 2; : : : ; n, have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities over a one-dimensional space X  R of alternatives, and suppose the agents
decide on an alternative in each of an innite number of periods according to the following
protocol: in any period t, if no alternative has previously been agreed upon, then an agent
is drawn randomly to make a proposal, x, which is followed by a vote; if the proposal
passes, then the outcome in period t and all subsequent periods is x, and each agent
i receives utility u
i
(x) in periods t; t + 1; t + 2; : : :; if the proposal is rejected, then the
outcome in period t is a status quo policy q 2 X, each agent i receives utility u
i
(q) in
period t, and bargaining moves to period t+1, where this process is repeated. If outcome
x is passed in period t, then each agent i's discounted utility is
(1  Æ
t 1
)u
i
(q) + Æ
t 1
u
i
(x);
where Æ 2 [0; 1) is a common discount factor. (Here, we normalize the discounted sum
by (1  Æ).) Let p
i
denote the history-independent probability that i is drawn to make a
proposal. Complete information is assumed.
A class of strategy proles of much interest in this model are the stationary strategy
proles, in which the proposal of an agent i is history-independent and the vote of an
agent depends only on the alternative proposed. Letting A
i
denote the \acceptance set"
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for i, the proposals that agent i would vote for, and letting M denote the collection of
coalitions C containing a majority of agents, we dene
A =
[
C2M
\
i2C
A
i
as the \social acceptance set." These are the proposals that would be passed if made. A
no-delay strategy prole is one for which x
i
2 A for all agents. Given a no-delay prole,
it is easy to see that each agent i's continuation value, v
i
, is history-independent and,
moreover,
v
i
=
X
j2N
p
j
u
i
(x
j
):
A no-delay stationary equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which (i) each agent
i proposes x
i
2 argmaxfu
i
(x) j x 2 Ag, and (ii) each agent i votes for any proposal that
is weakly preferred to continuing the bargaining process, i.e.,
A
i
= fx 2 X j u
i
(x)  (1  Æ)u
i
(q) + Æv
i
g:
Note that this equilibrium condition on voting strategies incorporates the renement of
stage-undominated strategies in voting stages with default bias in favor of proposals.
Existence of no-delay stationary equilibria follows from a general result, allowing for
multiple dimensions and arbitrary concave utility functions, in Banks and Duggan (2003).
This model can be mapped into the framework of the previous section by adding a
countable set of dummy players, indexed d
1
; d
2
; : : :, each with type set f1; 2; : : : ; ng, to
incorporate the random selection of proposers. The types of the dummy players are in-
dependently and identically distributed according to the distribution p = (p
1
; p
2
; : : : ; p
n
).
We give the agents singleton sets of types, reecting the assumption of complete infor-
mation in the original model. In each period t, the dummy player d
t
designates an agent
to make a proposal; that agent then proposes; and then all agents vote. We suppose that
all agents use stationary strategies as described above, while type i of any dummy player
simply designates player i to propose. The agents' beliefs about the dummy players'
types are simply iid with marginal p throughout the game. This transformation of the
original model preserves the continuation values of the agents and leaves the strategy
proles satisfying (i) and (ii) unaected. Obviously, a stage following the proposal of
any agent is a voting stage with the counting measure on the set of agents, and any
no-delay stationary equilibrium of the original model corresponds to a strategy prole
that is stage-undominated with default bias (in favor of the proposal) after every history.
Because X is one-dimensional and the number of voters is odd, there is a unique median
in all directions, x

, and the distribution of ideal points is resolute at x

.
Thus, Proposition 3.2 implies that, given a no-delay stationary equilibrium and given
any history, a proposal will pass if and only if the median voter weakly prefers passage to
continuing the bargaining process. That is, the social acceptance set is exactly equal to the
median voter's acceptance set in every no-delay stationary equilibrium. This provides a
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game-theoretic foundation for a partial median voter result on bargaining in committees,
one that diers from Black (1958) in that the median voter dictates the outcomes of
each vote but, because other agents may make proposals, his/her ideal point may not
be the unique outcome. This consideration arises, of course, because we explicitly model
the proposal process and the incentives of agents in their roles as proposer and voter.
Elsewhere (Banks and Duggan (2003)), we have shown that the set of outcomes passed
in no-delay stationary equilibria converges to the median as agents become arbitrarily
patient, even if utilities are not quadratic.
Whereas the above model is investigated in Banks and Duggan (2003), a related
model is taken up in Banks and Duggan (2000). A special case is the model in which
utility functions are quadratic plus a common constant c such that u
i
(x) + c  0 for all
x 2 X, and in which each agent's status quo payo is zero (so the status quo is \bad"
for all agents, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). It can be checked that, in that model
too, the median voter is decisive in the above sense.
4.3 Repeated Elections
Suppose a continuum of voters, N = [0; 1], must choose between an incumbent and a
challenger for political oÆce in each of an innite number of periods. The oÆceholder
in any period t chooses a policy y
t
2 X = [0; 1], and a voter with ideal point x receives
quadratic utility u
x
(y
t
) in that period. In the subsequent period, a challenger is drawn
uniformly from the population of voters to run against the incumbent in a majority-rule
election. Voters vote simultaneously by secret ballot, and the incumbent wins if and only
if he/she receives at least half of the votes; otherwise, the challenger takes oÆce. In either
case, the winner chooses the policy y
t+1
for period t + 1. This sequence of challenger
draws, elections, and policy choices determines an innite sequence y
1
; y
2
; : : : of policies,
yielding utility
(1  Æ)
1
X
t=1
Æ
t 1
u
x
(y
t
);
to a voter with ideal point x, where Æ 2 [0; 1) is a common discount factor.
Voter ideal points are private information, with the marginal distribution of each
voter's ideal point given by the continuous, strictly increasing distribution function F .
Because there is a continuum of voters, we do not assume voter ideal points are inde-
pendently distributed, but we assume nite-dimensional independence, i.e., conditional
on any nite number of other voters' ideal points, the ideal point of each voter i is dis-
tributed according to F . Moreover, we assume that a law of large numbers holds: the
distribution of type proles is such that, for almost every type prole, the set of voters
with ideal points less than or equal to x is measurable, and the fraction of such voters is
F (x), i.e.,
(fi j (i)  xg) = F (x);
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where  here is the Lebesgue measure.
5
We refer to the proles for which these conditions
hold as regular. Thus, F represents not only the marginal distribution of any voter's
ideal point, but it also represents (with probability one) the distribution of ideal points
across the electorate and, therefore, the distribution of challenger ideal points. Note
that, because F is continuous, the probability that any one voter is ever selected is
zero. We assume that a voter's ideal point is never directly observed, even if drawn as
a challenger and elected as oÆceholder, though an oÆceholder may reveal information
about his/her ideal point through policy choices while in oÆce. By nite-independence,
updating about the oÆceholder's ideal point does not aect a voter's beliefs about other
voters' ideal points.
A class of strategy proles of interest in this model are the simple strategy proles,
in which (i) a voter with ideal point x always chooses the same point p
x
if ever elected
to oÆce, where p
x
is measurable with respect to x, and (ii) a voter with ideal point
x votes to reelect the incumbent if and only if the incumbent's policy choice y in the
previous period satises a history-independent utility standard u
x
, which is measurable
as a function of x. Thus, a voter with ideal point x votes for the incumbent if and only
if u
x
(y)  u
x
. Letting
A
x
= fy 2 [0; 1] j u
x
(y)  u
x
g
denote the acceptance set for a voter with ideal point x, letting Pr(C) =
R
C
dF denote
the proportion of voters with ideal points in a measurable set C  X, and letting M
denote the collection of all measurable sets C satisfying Pr(C)  1=2, we dene
A =
[
C2M
\
x2C
A
x
as the social acceptance set, the set of policies that, if chosen, would lead to reelection of
the incumbent. Because u
x
is measurable, A is measurable for every regular type prole.
To see this, note that, if  is regular, then x 2 A if and only if
Z
(x; z)F (dz) 
1
2
;
where
(x; z) =

1 if x 2 A
z
0 else,
a jointly measurable function. Then measurability of
R
(; z)dF follows from Fubini's
theorem (cf. Aliprantis and Border (1999), Theorem 11.26). Thus, A is measurable.
Given a simple strategy prole, we dene beliefs throughout the game as follows.
In period t, following elections of oÆceholders i
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
k
, let y
1
; y
2
; : : : ; y
k
denote the
last policy choices of these politicians. For each politician m, let T
m
= p
 1
(y
m
) if this
5
Theorem 2 in Judd (1985) establishes the existence of such a distribution over type proles.
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set is non-empty, and otherwise let T
m
= f0g.
6
Then the updated beliefs of a type x
voter are given by the prior over  conditioned on (i
m
) 2 T
m
, m = 1; 2; : : : ; k and
(i) = x. By nite independence, the conditional beliefs about the types of all other
voters are still given by F . Let W = fx 2 X j p
x
2 Ag denote the set of \winning" ideal
points, and let L = X nW denote the set of \losing" ideal points, both measurable under
our assumptions. Assuming it exists, it is then straightforward, using the law of large
numbers, to solve for the continuation value of electing a challenger for a voter with ideal
point x as
v
x
=
R
W
u
x
(p
z
)F (dz) + (1  Æ)
R
L
u
x
(z)F (dz)
1  Pr(L)Æ
;
where the rst term in the numerator accounts for challengers who choose policies in A
and the second, appropriately discounted, for those who do not.
A simple equilibrium is a simple strategy prole in which (iii) an oÆceholder with
ideal point x chooses y 2 argmaxfu
x
(z) j z 2 Ag if
maxfu
x
(z) j z 2 Ag  Æv
x
and otherwise chooses y = x, and (iv) a voter with ideal point x votes to reelect an
incumbent who chose y 2 A[L in the previous period (and so followed the path of play)
if and only if
u
x
(y)  v
x
:
That is, an oÆceholder chooses between remaining in oÆce by satisfying a majority of
voters (choosing the best point in A) and leaving oÆce (choosing his/her ideal point).
Voters compare the continuation value of retaining an incumbent and the continuation
value of an unknown challenger, and vote for the incumbent if he/she oers at least as
high a continuation value as the challenger. Note that this equilibrium condition on
voting strategies incorporates the renement of stage-undominated strategies in voting
stages with default bias in favor of the incumbent. Existence of simple equilibria is
established as a special case of a general result in Banks and Duggan (2002) that allows
for multiple policy dimensions and arbitrary concave utility functions, but we do assume
a nite number of possible types there. In that case, we must allow oÆceholders with
ideal points x =2 A to mix over the best policies in the acceptance set (thereby winning)
and their ideal point (thereby losing) when indierent. This is not an issue when F is
continuous and strictly increasing, as we assume here.
To map this model into the framework of the previous section, we use a countable
set, M  [ 1; 0), of dummy players, as in Application 4.2, to incorporate the random
selection of challengers. We index these players d
1
; d
2
; : : :. We will assume that the
types of the dummy players are independently and identically distributed according to
6
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the median of F is greater than one half. Thus, in
equilibrium, oÆceholders who choose policies o the equilibrium path will not be reelected.
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the distribution F . In each period t, the dummy player d
t
designates a voter to run
for oÆce as the challenger; all voters other than the candidates (for technical reasons,
below) then cast their votes; and the winner then chooses a policy for that period. We
assume that all voters use simple strategies as described above, while a type x dummy
player simply chooses a voter of type x. Beliefs of the voters are as described above. This
transformation of the original model preserves the continuation values of the voters, if
the expression in (13) is well-dened, and leaves the strategy proles satisfying (i) and
(ii) unaected.
To construct continuation values for the voters, we extend the denition of a type
prole  so that it maps every i 2M [N to a type in X, and we extend the denition of
regular prole to this space. We endow the space of type proles with the sigma algebra
generated by sets of the form
f j (i) 2 Cg;
where i 2 M [ N and C is a Lebesgue measurable subset of X. We then extend this
sigma algebra so that the space of regular proles is measurable and assume the regular
proles have probability one (cf. Judd (1985), Theorems 1 and 2). Letting 0 denote a
vote for the incumbent and 1 a vote for the challenger, and letting R denote the set of
measurable functions r : N ! f0; 1g, representing election returns in any given period,
the innite histories in this electoral game lie in the set
X N  RX N R X     ;
where a sequence (x
1
; i
2
; r
2
; x
2
; i
3
; r
3
; x
3
; : : :) represents the period one policy (chosen by
an arbitrary initial oÆceholder, i
1
), the period two challenger, the period two election
return, the period two policy, and so on. We endow all nite histories with the sigma
algebra generated by rectangles of the form
X
1
N
2
 R
2
X
2
    ;
where N
1
; N
2
; : : : are nite or conite subsets of [0; 1], and where X
1
; X
2
; : : : are Lebesgue
measurable subsets ofX. As for election returns, we letR
I
denote the set of returns r such
that
R
r d  1=2; and we let R
C
denote the set of returns r such that
R
r d < 1=2. We
then impose that R
2
; R
3
; : : : lie in f;; R
I
; R
C
; Rg, indicating either that neither candidate
won, that the incumbent won, that the challenger won, or that one of the candidates won.
Given a strategy prole as specied above, the set of type proles for which the period
one policy lies in X
1
is just
P
1
= f j (i
1
) 2 p
 1
(X
1
)g;
which is measurable by measurability of policy choice strategies and by choice of sigma
algebra on the space of type proles. The set of type proles for which (x
1
; i
2
) 2 X
1
N
2
is
P
2
= P
1
\ f j (d
1
) 2 N
2
g;
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which is also measurable. The set of (regular) type proles for which (x
1
; i
2
; r
2
) 2 X
1

N
2
R
I
is
P
3
= P
2
\
i2N
2
f j (i) 2 Wg;
which is measurable because W is measurable, and similarly for other collections of
election returns.
7
Measurability of proles corresponding to histories of greater length
can be established by an induction argument based on these observations. This allows
us to dene the probability measures 
k+m
i
(t; h
k
) on histories using  in the obvious way.
Furthermore, the outcome functions for nite histories are simply dened as projections
onto the policy choices of oÆceholders, e.g.,
f
k3k 2
(x
1
; i
2
; r
2
; x
2
; : : : ; i
k
; r
k
; x
k
) = (x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
k
);
which are measurable with respect to the above sigma algebras on the H
k
's. This allows
us to dene the probability measures 
i
(t; h
k
) on outcome sequences required for (13), as
required.
Note that beliefs over outcome sequences are symmetric at every vote: though the
non-candidates have private information about their own types, and therefore how they
would vote in the future, the probability that any one is selected to run for oÆce is
zero. The only voters with private information about future policy outcomes are the
candidates, who do not cast a vote. (Indeed, along the equilibrium path, the incumbent's
future policy choices are known, so he/she does not have private information about policy
outcomes.) Thus, following the selection of a challenger, we have a voting stage with the
Lebesgue measure on the set of voters, and any simple equilibrium of the original model
corresponds to a strategy prole that is stage-undominated with default bias (for the
incumbent) at every vote. Because X is one-dimensional, there is a unique median in all
directions, and the distribution of ideal points is resolute at that point.
Thus, Proposition 3.2 implies that, given a simple equilibrium, given any history, and
given any type prole, an incumbent will be reelected if and only if the median voter weakly
prefers the incumbent to a randomly chosen challenger. That is, the social acceptance set
is exactly equal to the median voter's acceptance set in every simple equilibrium. This
partially extends the median voter result of Downs (1957) from a static model of party
competition, in which two parties adopt policy platforms prior to election, to a very
dierent model of innitely repeated elections with incomplete information, in which
political actors are unable to compete for votes by position-taking. Here, of course, the
median voter does not dictate policy outcomes, but rather electoral outcomes. From a
technical point of view, this property has proven to drastically simplify the computation
of equilibria and the theoretical analysis of this model.
7
Non-regular type proles may produce reelection when x =2 W , or may give victory to a challenger
when x 2 W , because the distribution of types in the electorate may disagree with F . The voters'
updated posteriors place outer probability zero on these proles throughout the game, so we may ignore
them.
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